A New Dynamic Logic

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A Type-theoretic reconstruction of DRT
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Motivation:

- to formalize DRT within Church’s simple theory of type (aka, Higher-Order Logic), which will allow DRT and Montague semantics to rest on the same logical foundations.
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Challenge:

• to express dynamics using “static” primitives (in particular, to avoid the “destructive assignment” problem, which necessitates a LISP-like gensym operator).
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Challenge:

- to express dynamics using “static” primitives (in particular, to avoid the “destructive assignment” problem, which necessitates a LISP-like gensym operator).

Proposed solution:

- to interpret a sentence according to both its left and right contexts;
- to abstract these two kinds of contexts over the meaning of the sentences.
Typing the left and the right contexts
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Montague semantics is based on Church’s simple type theory, which provides a full hierarchy of functional types built upon two atomic types:

- $\iota$, the type of individuals (a.k.a. entities).
- $o$, the type of propositions (a.k.a. truth values).
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We add a third atomic type, $\gamma$, which stands for the type of the left contexts.
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What about the type of the right contexts?
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What about the type of the right contexts?

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{left context} & : \gamma \\
\text{right context} & : \gamma \rightarrow o
\end{align*}
\]
Semantic interpretation of the sentences
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Let $s$ be the syntactic category of sentences. Remember that we intend to abstract our notions of left and right contexts over the meaning of the sentences.
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$$[s] = \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$$
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Composition of two sentence interpretations
Semantic interpretation of the sentences

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$$[s] = \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$$

Composition of two sentence interpretations

$$[S_1 \cdot S_2] = \lambda e \phi. [S_1] e (\lambda e'. [S_2] e' \phi)$$
Semantic interpretation of the syntactic categories
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Montague’s interpretation

\[
\begin{align*}
[s] &= o \\
[n] &= \iota \to o \\
[np] &= (\iota \to o) \to o
\end{align*}
\]
Semantic interpretation of the syntactic categories

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\begin{align*}
[s] & = o \\
[n] & = \iota \rightarrow o \\
[np] & = \left( \iota \rightarrow o \right) \rightarrow o
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may be rephrased as follows:

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[s] & = o \quad (1) \\
[n] & = \iota \rightarrow [s] \quad (2) \\
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Replacing (1) with:

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Replacing (1) with:

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we obtain:

\[
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[n] & = \nu \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o \\
[np] & = (\nu \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o) \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o
\end{align*}
\]
This interpretation results in handcrafted lexical semantics such as the following:

\[
\text{[every]} = \lambda n \psi e \phi. (\forall x. \neg (n x e (\lambda e. \neg (\psi x (x::e) (\lambda e. \top)))))) \land \phi e
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Questions:

- is there a systematic way of obtaining the new lexical semantics from Montague’s?
- can we find any “modular” presentation of the approach?
- is there some dynamic logic hidden in the approach?
A Dynamic Logic
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Let $\Omega \triangleq \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha$. We intend to design a logic acting on propositions of type $\Omega$. 
A Dynamic Logic

Let $\Omega \triangleq \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$. We intend to design a logic acting on propositions of type $\Omega$

We share with DRT the two following assumptions:

- discourse composition is mainly conjunctive (roughly speaking, a discourse consists in the conjunction of its sentences);
- the main form of quantification is existential (it introduces referential markers).
A Dynamic Logic

Let $\Omega \triangleq \gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$. We intend to design a logic acting on propositions of type $\Omega$.

We share with DRT the two following assumptions:

- discourse composition is mainly conjunctive (roughly speaking, a discourse consists in the conjunction of its sentences);
- the main form of quantification is existential (it introduces referential markers).

Consequently, our logic will be based on conjunction and existential quantification (defined as primitives). The other connectives will be obtained using negation (a third primitive) and de Morgan’s laws.
Formal Framework

We consider a simply-typed $\lambda$-calculus, the terms of which are built upon a signature including the following constants:
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FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

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\begin{align*}
\top & : o \\
\neg & : o \to o \\
\land & : o \to o \to o \\
\exists & : (\nu \to o) \to o
\end{align*}
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(truth) (negation) (conjunction) (existential quantification)
Formal Framework

We consider a simply-typed $\lambda$-calculus, the terms of which are built upon a signature including the following constants:

FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

- $\top : o$ (truth)
- $\neg : o \rightarrow o$ (negation)
- $\wedge : o \rightarrow o \rightarrow o$ (conjunction)
- $\exists : (\iota \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$ (existential quantification)

DYNAMIC PRIMITIVES

- $:: : \iota \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow \gamma$ (context updating)
- $\text{sel} : \gamma \rightarrow \iota$ (choice operator)
Conjunction
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Conjunction is nothing but sentence composition. We therefore define:

\[ A \sqcap B \triangleq \lambda e. \phi. A e \ (\lambda e. B e \phi) \]
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Existential quantification
Conjunction

Conjunction is nothing but sentence composition. We therefore define:

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Existential quantification

Existential quantification introduces “reference markers”. It is therefore responsible for context updating:

$$\Sigma x. P x \triangleq \lambda e \phi. \exists x. P x (x::e) \phi$$
**Conjunction**

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Existential quantification introduces “reference markers”. It is therefore responsible for context updating:

\[ \Sigma x. P x \triangleq \lambda e \phi. \exists x. P x (x::e) \phi \]

Negation

Negation cannot be canonically defined because we do not want the continuation of the discourse to fall into the scope of the negation:

\[ \sim A \triangleq \lambda e \phi. \neg (A e (\lambda e. \top)) \land \phi e \]
Implication and Universal Quantification
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These are defined using de Morgan’s laws:

\[ A \sqsubseteq B \triangleq \lnot(A \sqcap \lnot B) \]
\[ \Pi x. Px \triangleq \lnot \Sigma x. \lnot (P x) \]
Implication and Universal Quantification

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Embedding of first-order logic into dynamic logic
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\]

Embedding of first-order logic into dynamic logic

\[
\begin{align*}
R t_1 \ldots t_n &= \lambda e \phi. R t_1 \ldots t_n \wedge \phi e \\
\neg A &= \sim A \\
\neg \neg A &= A \\
\neg (A \wedge B) &= \neg A \cap \neg B \\
\neg \exists x. A &= \Sigma x. \neg A
\end{align*}
\]
Implication and Universal Quantification

These are defined using de Morgan’s laws:

\[ A \sqsubseteq B \triangleq \sim (A \sqcap \sim B) \]
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Embedding of first-order logic into dynamic logic

\[ \text{R}\text{t}_1 \ldots t_n = \lambda e \phi. \text{R}\text{t}_1 \ldots t_n \land \phi e \]
\[ \text{\neg} A = \sim A \]
\[ \overline{A \land B} = \overline{A} \land \overline{B} \]
\[ \exists x. A = \Sigma x. A \]

This embedding is such that, for every term \( e \) of type \( \gamma \):

\[ A \equiv \overline{A} e (\lambda e. \top) \]
Donkey sentence revisited
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Montague-like semantic interpretation:

\[
\begin{align*}
\llbracket \text{farmer} \rrbracket & = \text{farmer} \\
\llbracket \text{donkey} \rrbracket & = \text{donkey} \\
\llbracket \text{owns} \rrbracket & = \lambda OS. S (\lambda x. O (\lambda y. \text{own} \ x \ y)) \\
\llbracket \text{beats} \rrbracket & = \lambda OS. S (\lambda x. O (\lambda y. \text{beat} \ x \ y)) \\
\llbracket \text{who} \rrbracket & = \lambda RQx. Q x \land R (\lambda P. P x) \\
\llbracket \text{a} \rrbracket & = \lambda PQ. \exists x. P x \land Q x \\
\llbracket \text{every} \rrbracket & = \lambda PQ. \forall x. P x \supset Q x \\
\llbracket \text{it} \rrbracket & = ???
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Donkey sentence revisited

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Dynamic interpretation:

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\text{[beats]} & = \lambda OS. S (\lambda x. O (\lambda y. \underline{\text{beat}} \, x \, y)) \\
\text{[who]} & = \lambda R Q x. Q \, x \sqcap R (\lambda P. P \, x) \\
\text{[a]} & = \lambda P Q. \Sigma x. P \, x \sqcap Q \, x \\
\text{[every]} & = \lambda P Q. \Pi x. P \, x \sqsupset Q \, x \\
\text{[it]} & = \lambda P e \phi. P (\text{sel} \, e) \, e \, \phi
\end{align*}
\]
With the dynamic interpretation we have that:

\[
\text{[beats][it]} \ (\text{[every]} \ (\text{[who]} \ (\text{[owns]} \ (\text{[a]} \ [\text{donkey}]) \ [\text{farmer}])))
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\(\beta\)-reduces to the following term (modulo de Morgan’s laws):

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\lambda e. (\forall x. \textbf{farmer} \ x \supset (\forall y. \textbf{donkey} \ y \supset (\textbf{own} \ x \ y \supset \textbf{beat} \ x \ (\textbf{sel} \ (x::y::e)))))) \land \phi \ e
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\(\beta\)-reduces to the following term (modulo de Morgan’s laws):

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\lambda e. (\forall x. \text{farmer } x \supset (\forall y. \text{donkey } y \supset (\text{own } x \, y \supset \text{beat } x \, (\text{sel } (x::y::e)))))) \land \phi e
\]

that is, assuming that \(\text{sel}\) is a “perfect” anaphora resolution operator:

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Comparison with existing works
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Most existing works on dynamics (DRT, Muskens’, Groenendijk & Stokhof’s) interpret dynamic propositions as binary relations on states (a.k.a., assignments or environments).
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In our setting, these would be terms of type:

$$\gamma \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow o,$$
Comparison with existing works

Most existing works on dynamics (DRT, Muskens’, Groenendijk & Stokhof’s) interpret dynamic propositions as binary relations on states (a.k.a., assignments or environments).

In our setting, these would be terms of type:

\[ \gamma \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow o, \]

and the semantics of Groenendijk & Stokhof’s DPL would be rephrased as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
A_d & \triangleq \lambda gh. h = g \land A & \text{(atomic proposition)} \\
(\neg P)_d & \triangleq \lambda gh. h = g \land \neg (\exists k. P_d h k) & \text{(negation)} \\
(P \land Q)_d & \triangleq \lambda gh. \exists k. P_d g k \land Q_d k h & \text{(conjunction)} \\
(\exists x. P)_d & \triangleq \lambda gh. \exists k. k[x]g \land P_d k h & \text{(existential)}
\end{align*}
\]
There exists a canonical embedding $[\cdot:]$ from $\gamma \to \gamma \to o$ into $\gamma \to (\gamma \to o) \to o$:

$$[R] \triangleq \lambda e \phi. \exists e'. \phi e' \land Re e'$$
There exists a canonical embedding $[\cdot]$ from $\gamma \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow o$ into $\gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$:

$$[R] \triangleq \lambda e. \exists e'. \phi e' \land Re e'$$

Then, we have:

$$[A_d] \equiv \overline{A}$$
$$[(\neg P)_d] \equiv \sim [P_d]$$
$$[(P \land Q)_d] \equiv [P_d] \cap [Q_d]$$
There exists a canonical embedding $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$ from $\gamma \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow o$ into $\gamma \rightarrow (\gamma \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o$:

$$\llbracket R \rrbracket \triangleq \lambda e \phi. \exists e'. \phi e' \land R e e'$$

Then, we have:

$$\llbracket A_d \rrbracket \equiv \overline{A}$$
$$\llbracket (\neg P)_d \rrbracket \equiv \sim [P_d]$$
$$\llbracket (P \land Q)_d \rrbracket \equiv [P_d] \cap [Q_d]$$

As for the existential quantifier:

$$\llbracket (\exists x. P)_d \rrbracket = \lambda e \phi. \exists e'. \phi e' \land \exists k. k[x]e \land [P_d] k e'$$

$$\sum x. \llbracket P_d \rrbracket = \lambda e \phi. \exists e'. \phi e' \land \exists x. \llbracket P_d \rrbracket (x :: e) e'$$
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- Relatively independent of the underlying logic:
  - generalization to H.O.L. is straightforward;
  - an intuitionistic version could be worked out.
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- No destructive assignment.
- Parametric in $\gamma$.
- Relatively independent of the underlying logic:
  - generalization to H.O.L. is straightforward;
  - an intuitionistic version could be worked out.
- Relies on well-established existing theories (proof-theory and model theory for free).
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- Parametric in $\gamma$.
- Relatively independent of the underlying logic:
  - generalization to H.O.L. is straightforward;
  - an intuitionistic version could be worked out.
- Relies on well-established existing theories (proof-theory and model theory for free).
- Deduction is replaced by computation.